



# PKI architecture and technical specifications (v2)

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## Deliverable 2.4.4.6

### Activity 2: Studies

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## Information on the document

To set out this deliverable, SCOOP Partner modified ISE project's deliverable ISX-TEO-SE-ISE-LIV-0061\_0.10, in order to take into account the global PKI architecture chosen in SCOOP. This action has been taken following SCOOP Studies SC in date of 08<sup>th</sup> April 2015.

Then, new modification were inserted in light of ISE Project's new release ISX-TEO-SE-ISE-LIV-0061\_1.1, in date of date 15/07/15 (public release).

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## Publication history

Date	Version	Author(s)	Updates & changes	Diffusion
12/05/2017	2.00	TPT H. Labiod JP. Monteuis	New deliverable	Release 2

### Reference to the version administration

Version number to be composed of 3 digits > vR.XY

- **R** corresponds to the release number : it is upgraded each time SC Studies validates the diffusion of a new release,
- **X** is the major version number: it is upgraded each time SC Studies validates the deliverable,
- **Y** is the minor version number: it is upgraded each time a contributor changes anything.

Once the deliverable is approved, its version number is upgraded from vR.XY to vR.(X+1)0

Once the deliverable is release, its version number is upgraded from vR.XY to v(R+1).00

As illustration :

- 0.03 > Work in progress version
- 0.10 > Del. Approved by SC Studies but not released
- 2.00 > Del. approved & released (in release 2)
- 2.05 > Del. Updated - in progress version

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1 Objective

This document is primarily written for the implementers. The document provides references to the high-level PKI architecture and directs the reader to the detailed information cited in the document [i.1].

## 1.2 Typographic conventions

The following typographic conventions are used in this document:

EX ::= SEQUENCE {}      Code example

[1] Numbers in-between square brackets are references to publications mentioned in the appendix References.

## 1.3 Definitions and abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following definitions and abbreviations apply:

Abbreviations	Definitions
Access Point	Access point is a HTTP URL used to access web services of the PKI.
Anonymity	Anonymity is the ability of a user to use a resource or service without disclosing its identity.
Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA)	Security management entity responsible for issuing, monitoring the use of authorization tickets.
Pseudonym Certificate (PC)	Data object that demonstrates that the holder has permissions which entitle him to take specific actions.
Confidentiality	Confidentiality is a set of rules or a promise that limits access or places restrictions on certain types of information.
Certificate Revocation List (CRL)	Certificate Revocation List is a list digitally signed by a CA that contains certificates identities that are no longer valid.
Distribution Center (DC)	Distribution Center provides ITS-S the updated trust information necessary for performing the validation process to control that received information is coming from a legitimate and authorized ITS-S or PKI certification authority.
Integrity	Integrity means maintaining and assuring the accuracy and consistency of data over its entire life-cycle.

ITS Station (ITS-S): ITSS-V or ITSS-R	ITS Station is end-user of the PKI system. The PKI system provides it different certificates (LTC or PC) to allow secure communications. ITS-S can be normal vehicles, public safety vehicles, roadside stations, nomadic devices and traffic management centers...
Manufacturer	Manufacturer installs necessary information for security management in ITS-S at production.
Long Term Certificate Authority (LTCA)	Security management entity responsible for the life cycle management of long term certificate (LTC).
Long Term Certificate (LTC)	Data object that is used in message exchanges between an ITS Station and a security management entity and demonstrates that the valid holder is entitled to apply for pseudonym certificate.
Root CA (RCA)	Root Certificate Authority is the root of trust for all certificates within the PKI hierarchy. Root CA issues certificates for EAs and PCAs to authorize them to issue certificates to end-entities. It also defines and controls policies among all certificate issuers. The Root CA is required when a new LTCA or PCA shall be created, or when the lifetime of LTCA or PCA certificate expires.
Trust-service Status List (TSL)	The Trust-service Status List is a signed list which contains new RCA certificates, LTCA and PCA certificates and PKI service addresses (PCA and DC). This list is signed by the RCA and can be transmitted over the air.

## 1.4 References

### 1.4.1 Normative references

The following references documents are not essential to the use of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

[1] ETSI TS 103 097 (v1.2.1): ITS; Security; Security header and certificate formats

[2] ETSI TS 102 941 (v1.1.1): ITS; Security; Trust and Privacy Management

[3] X.680: Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation

[4] X.690: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specifications of Basic Encoding Rules (BER), Canonical Encoding Rules (CER), and Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER)

[5] X.691: Information Technology - ASN.1 encoding rules: Specification of Packed

Encoding Rules (PER)

[6] RFC2616: HTTP/1.1

[7] NIST SP 800-38C: Recommendation for Block Cipher Modes of Operation: The CCM Mode for Authentication and Confidentiality

[8] ETSI EN 302637-2: ITS; Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of Applications; Part 2: Specification of Cooperative Awareness Basic Service

[9] ETSI EN 302637-3: ITS; Vehicular Communications; Basic Set of Applications; Part 2: Specifications of Decentralized Environmental Notification Basic Service

[10] ETSI TR 102 965: ITS; Application Object Identifier (ITS-AID); Registration list

[11] FIPS 198-1: The Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC)

## 1.4.2 Informative references

The following references documents are not essential to the use of the present document but they assist the user with regard to a particular subject area.

[i.1] PKI System Requirements Specifications (ISX-TEO-SE-ISE)- Deliverable 2.4.4-5

[i.2] RFC5246: The TLS Protocol version 1.2

[i.3] RFC5084: Using AES-CCM and AES-GCM Authenticated Encryption in the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)

[i.4] SEC 1: Elliptic Curve Cryptography version 2.0

[i.5] ETSI TS 102 860: Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS); Classification and management of ITS application objects

[i.6] PKI architecture and technical specifications (v0.10) (ISX-TEO-SE-ISE)

## 2. System overview

### 2.1 High level architecture


This document describes the functionalities of the PKI system for ISE project.

The PKI system is divided into four entities:

- The Root Certificate Authority for the generation of CA private keys, a key step in the initiation of a trust chain.
- Long Term Certificate Authority (LTCA), used by Manufacturer and ITS-S, respectively for the ITS-S lifecycle management and for the provisioning of LTCAs.
- The Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA) used by ITS-S, for requesting PCs.
- The Distribution Center, used by ITS-S to retrieve CRL and TSL.

The PKI for ITS-S is a set of software modules enabling distribution of certificates for secured communication between ITS-S.

Figure 1 shows the SCOOP-ISE PKI high level architecture.



*Figure 1: PKI high level architecture*

## 2.2 Description of roles

### 2.2.1 Operator

The “operator” role is to install and update necessary information for security management in ITS-S during operation.

### 2.2.2 Manufacturer

The “manufacturer” role is to install necessary information for security management in ITS-S at production. More precisely, the manufacturer bootstraps the process for manufacturing a trusted ITS-S in production site, i.e. generates and stores securely required crypto-material in its security module, initializes RCA and LTCA certificates and their associated network addresses.

### 2.2.3 ITS-Station

The “ITS-Station” role is to request certificates (LTCs and PCs) from the LTCA and PCA. ITS Station only has access to the web service interface.

## 2.3 Higher-layer supported protocols

The hereafter described protocol tries to reach the following security objectives:

- **Authentication/authorization control:** authentication consists to be sure of the identity which sends data. Authorization control is the verification of an access policy, based on a trusted authentication. Authenticate all entities participating in the protocol is required to prevent illegitimate persons to enter in the system, or to access some unauthorized resources or services.
- **Integrity:** the integrity of all transmitted data is important to ensure that the contents of the received data are not altered.
- **Confidentiality/Privacy:** data should only be accessed by authorized entities. The real identity of ITS Station has to be protected, by cryptographic mechanisms and depending on the type of data sent.
- **Non-repudiation/Traceability:** Non-repudiation is necessary to prevent ITS Station or others entities from denying the transmission or the content of their messages. Traceability, which is the warranty that an entity can't refute the emission or reception of information, is also extremely important.
- **Unlinkability:** ability of a user to make multiple uses of resources or services without others being able to link these uses together.
- **Anonymity:** ability of a user to use a resource or service without disclosing the user's identity.

To support security management of trusted ITS-S (vehicles, road-side or center stations), an automatic communication means with the different PKI modules shall be provided by the ITS-S embedded system. This section specifies the higher layers of the protocol stack (see figure 2) and assumes either a fixed or cellular network with the ITS-S or an ITS G5 communication profile supporting IP connectivity.

Machine-to-machine communications with the LTCA, PCA, and DC components use HTTP/1.1 as a transport mechanism, over TCP, over IP. No supplementary cryptographic



layer such as TLS is required.

Messages are sent as HTTP GET or POST requests. Parameters for the POST requests and responses, and complete path for GET requests are described in the corresponding messages descriptions.

The chosen encoding rules are ASN.1 DER (Distinguished Encoding Rules), defined in [4].

Human-to-machine communications with the LTCA and PCA use HTTP/1.1 as a transport mechanism, over TCP, over IP, with TLS. A web interface (used by operators and manufacturers) is intended: this is out of scope of this document.




Figure 2: Higher-layer supported PKI protocols

## 3. PKI System

### 3.1 Functions

#### 3.1.1 Root Certificate Authority (RCA) component functions

The features of RCA component (see deliverable 2.4.4-5) are:

- Creation of RCA key pair and self-signed certificate;
- Issuance of CA (LTCA or PCA) certificates;
- Revocation of CA (LTCA or PCA) certificates;
- Generation of CA CRLs;
- Generation of a TSL.

##### 3.1.1.1 Create a RCA certificate

###### Objective

Create a RCA certificate.

###### Input Data

The following information is provided:

- The assurance level
- The ITS AID list
- The validity restrictions
  - The dates (`time_start_and_end`)
  - The region (optional)
- The name of the Certificate Authority (optional)

###### Output Data

A RCA certificate is created. The format of this certificate is described in ETSI Standard, see [1].

###### Traceability

The action is entered in the audit log.

The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

### 3.1.1.2 Create a LTCA certificate

#### Objective

Create a LTCA certificate.

#### Input Data

The following information is provided:

- The public keys (verification and encryption) to be signed.
- The ITS AID list in accordance with the ITS AID list of RCA.
- The assurance level.
- The validity restrictions
  - The dates (`time_start_and_end`)
  - The region in accordance with RCA's region (if applicable)
- The name of the Certificate Authority (optional).

#### Output Data

An LTCA certificate is created. The format of this certificate is described in ETSI Standard, see [1].

#### Traceability

The action is entered in the audit log.

The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

### 3.1.1.3 Create a PCA certificate

#### Objective

Create a PCA certificate.

#### Input Data

The following information is provided:

- The public key (verification key and encryption key) to signed
- The assurance level
- The ITS AID list in accordance with ITS AID list of the RCA
- The validity restrictions
  - The dates (`time_start_and_end`)
  - The region in accordance with RCA's region (if applicable)
- The name of the Certificate Authority (optional)

#### Output Data

A PCA certificate is created. The format of this certificate is described in ETSI Standard, see [1].

#### Traceability

The action is entered in the audit log.

The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

### 3.1.1.4 Revoke a CA certificate

**Objective**

Revoke a CA certificate (LTCA or PCA).

**Input Data**

The following information is provided:

- A LTCA or PCA certificate to be revoked

**Output Data**

A successful response is sent.

**Traceability**

The action is entered in the audit log. The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

### 3.1.1.5 Generate a CA Certificate Revocation List (CRL)

**Objective**

Generate a CA Certificate Revocation List.

**Input Data**

The following information is provided:

- The List of revoked certificates

**Output Data**

The CA CRL is generated. The format of the CA CRL is described in 3.2.6.

**Traceability**

The action is entered in the audit log.

The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

### 3.1.1.6 Generate Trust-service Status List (TSL)

**Objective**

Generate the Trust-service Status List.

**Input Data**

The following information is provided:

- CAs (RCA, LTCA, PCA) certificates
- PKI services addresses (RCA address, LTCA address, PCAs addresses and DC address)

**Output Data**

The TSL is generated. The format of the TSL is described in 3.2.7.

**Traceability**

The action is entered in the audit log.

The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

## 3.1.2 Long Term Certificate Authority (LTCA) component functions

The features of LTCA component (described in the first deliverable “PKI System Requirements Specifications”) are:

- Registration of ITS-S
- Management of ITS-S status
- Management of ITS-S permissions
- Issuance of Long Term Certificates
- Verification of ITS-S permissions for PC request

### 3.1.2.1 Register ITS Station

This feature is executed directly by the manufacturer through a graphical user interface (GUI).

### 3.1.2.2 Change status of ITS Station

This feature is executed directly by the manufacturer or the operator through a graphical user interface.

### 3.1.2.3 Change permissions of ITS Station

This feature is executed directly by the manufacturer through a graphical user interface.

### 3.1.2.4 Request a long-Term Certificate (LTC)

#### Role(s)

Only the ITS Station possessing the appropriate elements can perform this action.

#### Objective

An ITS Station requests a long-Term Certificate (LTC).

#### Input Data

ITS Station provides the following information:

- The canonical identifier of ITS Station called unique identifier is livable 2.4.4-4v2
- The public key (verification key)
- The response decryption public key
- The ITS AID SSP List (see [8] and [9])
- The validity restrictions (optional)
  - The date(s)
  - The region

#### Output Data

LTCA returns a message containing:

- A LTC, the format of this certificate is described in ETSI Standard, see [1].
- A response code (see 3.3.3.2 for more information).

### **Possible errors**

For each of the errors below, an error message is returned to ITS Station responsible for the action.

- ITS Station fails to provide the required values in the request
- ITS Station is unknown (not registered)
- An internal error occurs
- Etc.

### **Traceability**

The action is entered in the audit log.

The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

The traceability of this action is mandatory to lift the anonymity of ITS station.

## **3.1.2.5 Validate a Pseudonym Certificate (PC) request**

### **Role(s)**

Any PCA can perform this operation.

### **Objective**

Validate a PC request before producing a PC to the relevant ITS-S.

### **Input Data**

The PCA provides the following information as below to the LTCA for authenticating the requesting ITS-S and checking its permissions to get requested Pseudonym Certificate:

- LTCA identifier
- Validity restrictions
  - The date(s)
  - The region (optional)
- Subject attributes
- Encrypted structure containing the signature and the LTC identifier

### **Output Data**

LTCA returns a message containing:

- A response code (see 3.3.5.2 for more information).

### **Possible errors**

- The ITS-S is not authorized to get pseudonym certificates
- The ITS-S is not managed by the LTCA
- Etc.

### **Traceability**

The action is entered in the audit log.

The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

### 3.1.3 Pseudonym Certificate Authority (PCA) component functions

The features of PCA component (described in the first deliverable “PKI System Requirements Specifications”) are:

- The issuance of Pseudonym Certificate.

#### 3.1.3.1 Request pseudonym certificate(s) (PC)

##### **Role(s)**

Any ITS possessing an LTC can request a PC.

##### **Objective**

ITS station requests PC.

##### **Input Data**

ITS Station provides the following information:

- Verification public key(s)
- Encryption public key(s)
- LTCA identifier
- Validity restrictions
  - The date(s)
  - The region (optional)
- Subject attributes

##### **Output Data**

PCA returns a message containing:

- A PC, the format of this certificate is described in ETSI Standard, see [1].
- A response code (see 3.3.4.23.3.5.2 for more information).

##### **Possible errors**

For each of the errors below, an error message is returned to the ITS -S responsible for the action, if:

- The ITS-S fails to provide the required values in the request;
- The LTCA cannot be reached;
- The LTCA is unable to verify permissions of relevant ITS Station (see Validate PC request function);
- An internal error occurs;
- Etc.

##### **Traceability**

The action is entered in the audit log.

The action is viewable in the log from the operator interface.

The traceability of this action is mandatory to lift the anonymity of ITS station.

## 3.1.4 Distribution Center (DC) component functions

The features of DC (described in the first deliverable “PKI System Requirements Specifications”) are:

- Publication of a TSL;
- Publication of CA CRLs.

### 3.1.4.1 Get CA Certificate Revocation List

#### Role(s)

Everybody can perform this operation.

#### Objective

Everybody retrieves an updated CRL.

#### Output Data

The DC provides the CRL. The format of this CRL is described in 3.2.6.

#### Possible errors

For each of the errors below, an error message is returned to the ITS Station responsible for the action.

- An internal error occurs.
- Etc.

### 3.1.4.2 Get Trust-service Status List

#### Role(s)

Everybody can perform this operation.

#### Objective

Everybody retrieves an updated Trust-service Status List.

#### Output Data

The DC provides the TSL. The format of this TSL is described in 3.2.7.

#### Possible errors

For each of the errors below, an error message is returned to ITS-S responsible for the action.

- An internal error occurs
- Etc.



## 3.2 Data structures

The data structures `Data`, `SignedData`, `EncryptedData` and associated algorithm identifiers types described below are used to build protocol messages between ITS-S and PKI, and between PKI entities, with clearly defined security properties.

The CRL structure allows the revocation of long duration certificates (LTCs) used by actors and PKI entities.

### 3.2.1 General design rules

- `version` is placed first to allow for the block format to change (should not be used to describe the version of the inner content)
- `contentType` describes what is to be found in the associated inner content (and its version)
- cryptographic parameters are before the data to decrypt/verify (hash/signature algorithm, recipients, encryptionParameters), this allows to stream data
- `signature` is placed after the data

### 3.2.2 Data type

-used as the most external container

The content is optional to allow for external content declaration

```
Data ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    contentType ContentType,
    content OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
```

```
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER
```

### 3.2.3 Algorithm identifier types

This section defines sets of algorithms:

- signature algorithms
- data encryption algorithms
- key encryption algorithms
- hash algorithms

Each defined algorithm is associated to a unique identifier and is accompanied by optional parameters where applicable. The sets of algorithms are dynamically extensible (at runtime), which allows for crypto agility.

```
SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({SignatureFunctions}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({SignatureFunctions}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }
```

```
ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({DataEncryptionFunctions}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({DataEncryptionFunctions}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }
```

```
HashAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({HashFunctions}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({HashFunctions}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }
```

```
KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({KeyEncryptionFunctions}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({KeyEncryptionFunctions}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }
```

### 3.2.4 SignedData type

This data structure is flexible enough to allow for internal or external signed content, multiple signers, multiple signatures, and one-pass verification (stream).

Data is signed using the following process:

- an empty `SignedData` structure is created, with `version` set to `v1`, and `signedContentType` set to the appropriate value
- the signed data can either be enclosed in an OCTET STRING and included in the `SignedData` structure, or left aside (detached or external signature)
- each signer does:
  - choose the preferred hash algorithms: one to digest the signed content, one to digest the attributes
  - optionally include those hash algorithm identifiers in the `hashAlgorithms` collection, in order to facilitate the one-pass signature verification
  - digest the signed content and store the result in an `Attribute` structure of type `attr-messageDigest`
  - create an `Attribute` structure of type `attr-contentType` containing the `signedContentType` value
  - create a `SignerInfo` structure containing:
    - the 2 precedent `Attribute` structures in the `signedAttributes` collection
    - an optional `Attribute` of type `attr-signingTime` in the `signedAttributes` collection
    - the `signerIdentifier` set to the appropriate value
    - optionally the certificate chain in order to validate the signer
    - the `digestAlgorithm` equal to the hash algorithm used to digest the signed content
    - the `signatureAlgorithm` set to the signature algorithm used by the signer
    - the `signature` value, result of the signature operation applied to the serialization of the `signedAttributes` structure
  - include the composed `SignerInfo` structure in the `signerInfos` collection

It is important that the `attr-messageDigest` and `attr-contentType` attributes are included in the `signedAttributes`. Their presence is mandatory. The `attr-signingTime` is optional, and can be required depending on the context.

```
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    hashAlgorithms HashAlgorithmsIdentifiers,
    signedContentType ContentType,
    signedContent OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    signerInfos SignerInfos }
```

```
HashAlgorithmsIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF HashAlgorithmIdentifier
```

```
SignerInfos ::= SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo
```

```
SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    signer [0] SignerIdentifier DEFAULT self:NULL,
    digestAlgorithm [1] HashAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm id-sha256 },
    signatureAlgorithm [2] SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm
ecdsa-with-SHA256 },
    signedAttributes SignedAttributes,
    certificateChain SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL,
    signature SignatureValue }
```

```
SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
    self NULL,
    certificateDigest CertificateDigest,
    certificate Certificate }
```

```
CertificateDigest ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm HashAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm id-sha256 },
    digest HashedId8 }
```

```
SignedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute
```

```
Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
    attrType ATTRIBUTE.&id({SupportedAttributes}),
    attrValue ATTRIBUTE.&Type({SupportedAttributes}{@attrType}) OPTIONAL }
```

```
SignatureValue OCTET STRING
```

-- SignatureValue should be opaque to the user/caller of security functions.  
-- Internally, an ECDSA signature contains the following structure:

```
Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
    r INTEGER,
    s INTEGER }
```

## 3.2.5 EncryptedData type

Data is encrypted to a number of recipients following this process:

- The sender chooses a content encryption algorithm and parameters.
- The sender randomly generates a content encryption symmetric key.
- The sender encrypts this content encryption symmetric key for each recipient.
- For each recipient, a corresponding `RecipientInfo` structure is built.
- The content is encrypted using chosen algorithm, parameters, and content encryption symmetric key.
- The encrypted content, encryption algorithm parameters, and all `RecipientInfo` instances are collected together to form an `EncryptedData` structure.

When the recipient is identified by its public key and not by its certificate (for example when the recipient requests a certificate), the `recipients` field of type `HashedId8` shall be calculated as the 8 lowest order octets of the SHA256 digest of the encoded public key in compressed form.

If the encrypted content is to be transmitted outside of this `EncryptedData` structure, the `EncryptedData` structure can be used to transport the encrypted symmetric encryption key and encryption parameters. The `encryptedContent` element is optional.

```
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    recipients RecipientInfos,
    encryptedContentType ContentType,
    encryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    encryptedContent OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }
```

```
RecipientInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF RecipientInfo
```

```
RecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    recipient HashedId8,
    kexalgid KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm id-ecies-103097 },
    encryptedKeyMaterial OCTET STRING }
```

If `kexalgid` is the algorithm identified by `id-ecies-103097`, then the `encryptedKeyMaterial` shall contain the serialization of an `ECIESEncryptedKey103097` data type.

## 3.2.6 Certificate Revocation List

The Certificate Revocation List (CRL) is generated and signed by the RCA component.

### ASN.1 notation definition

```
Crl ::= SEQUENCE {
    unsigned_crl ToBeSignedCrl,
    signature_algorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
    signature Signature } -- signature is applied on unsigned_crl
```

```
ToBeSignedCrl ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version,
    signer SignerIdentifier,
    -- ca_id HashedId8, -- redondant si le modèle crl_signer n'est pas supporté)
    thisUpdate Time32,
    nextUpdate Time32,
    entries SEQUENCE OF HashedId8 }
```

## 3.2.7 Trust-service Status List

### ASN.1 notation definition

```
Tsl ::= SEQUENCE {
    unsigned_tsl ToBeSignedTsl,
    signature_algorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
    signature SignatureValue }
-- signature is applied on unsigned_tsl
```

```
ToBeSignedTsl ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version,
    signer_info SignerIdentifier,
    notBefore Time32,
    notAfter Time32,
    trust_services SEQUENCE OF TrustService }
```

```
TrustService ::= SEQUENCE {
    serviceId TRUSTSERVICE.&id ({TrustServiceSet}),
    serviceValue TRUSTSERVICE.&Value ({TrustServiceSet}{@serviceId}) }
```

```
TrustServiceSet TRUSTSERVICE ::=
{
    ts-foreignRoot
| ts-renewedRoot
| ts-ea
| ts-aa
| ts-distributionCenter
| ts-otherTslPointer
, ... }
```

```
TRUSTSERVICE ::= CLASS {
    &id ENUMERATED UNIQUE,
    &Value }
WITH SYNTAX {
    SYNTAX &Value
    ID &id }
```

```
ts-foreignRoot TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
  SYNTAX Certificate
  ID ServiceType:foreignRoot }
```

```
ts-renewedRoot TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
  SYNTAX SEQUENCE {
    rootCertificate Certificate,
    linkRootCertificate Certificate }
  ID ServiceType:renewedRoot }
```

```
ts-ea TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
  SYNTAX SEQUENCE {
    certificate Certificate,
    linkedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL,
    accessPoint IA5STRING }
  ID ServiceType:ea }
```

```
ts-aa TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
  SYNTAX SEQUENCE {
    certificate Certificate,
    accessPoint IA5STRING }
  ID ServiceType:aa }
```

```
ts-distributionCenter TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
  SYNTAX IA5STRING
  ID ServiceType:distributionCenter }
```

```
ts-otherTslPointer TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
  SYNTAX IA5STRING
  ID ServiceType:otherTslPointer }
```

```
ServiceType ::= ENUMERATED {
  foreignRoot,
  renewedRoot,
  ea,
  aa,
  distributionCenter,
  otherTslPointer,
  ... }
```

## 3.2.8 Mapping with ETSI Standards

Some data types defined in ETSI TS 103097 and used in this protocol need to be redefined in ASN.1 notation:

```
HashedId8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
Certificate ::= OCTET STRING
Time32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
```

The types `SubjectAttribute`, `ValidityRestriction`, `verification_key` and `its_aid_ssp_list` are defined in ETSI TS 103097.

A vector of `SubjectAttribute` elements as used by this protocol will be represented by the `SubjectAttributes` type. The content of an element of this data type will be the binary serialization of a variable-length vector with variable-length length encoding of `SubjectAttribute` elements. Similarly, a vector of `ValidityRestriction` elements will be represented by the `ValidityRestrictions` type, and the content of an element of this data type will be the binary serialization of a variable-length vector with variable-length length encoding of `ValidityRestriction` elements.

```
SubjectAttributes ::= OCTET STRING
ValidityRestrictions ::= OCTET STRING
```

For example, a vector of 2 `SubjectAttribute` elements (a `verification_key` and an `its_aid_ssp_list` composed of 2 ITS-AID-SSP) will be encoded as the octet string "30000002C43CDA0AD74CC8A93141DBE4F2C353EDB8DD416DB14F1766A638E00B7EE2A75210B2403010000250401000000", which is decomposed as:

```
30 (variable-length length of the vector)
{
  00 (type=verification_key)
  { <PublicKey>
    00 (algorithm=ecdsa_nistp256_with_sha256)
    { <EccPoint>
      02 (type=compressed_lsb_y_0)
      C43CDA0AD74CC8A93141DBE4F2C353EDB8DD416DB14F1766A638E00B7EE2A752 (x)
    }
  }
  21 (type=its_aid_ssp_list)
  {
    0B (variable-length length of the vector)
    {
      24 (its_aid=CAM)
      03 (variable-length length of the SSP)
      010000 (service_specific_permissions)
      25 (its_aid=DENM)
      04 (variable-length length of the SSP)
      01000000 (service_specific_permissions)
    }
  }
}
```



## 3.3 PKI Requests

### 3.3.1 Create RCA certificate

RCA generates its key pair and generates its self-signed certificate under trusted roles control.

### 3.3.2 Create Authority (LTCA/PCA) certificate

LTCA and PCA requests are transmitted by an off-band mechanism to the RCA entity.

#### 3.3.2.1 Request format

`ITSCertificateRequest` data type defines a standalone certificate request, which can be used to transport LTCA or PCA certificate request to the RCA.

```
ITSCertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
  itsCertReq ITSCertificateRequestContent,
  signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256 },
  signature SignatureValue }
```

```
ITSCertificateRequestContent ::= SEQUENCE {
  version Version DEFAULT v1,
  subjectName OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..32)),
  subjectAttributes OCTET STRING,
  validityRestrictions OCTET STRING }
```

The following profile shall apply:

- `version` is set to v1 (0)
- `subjectAttributes` shall contain the serialization of a `subjectAttributes` data type and shall contain both a `verification_key` and an `encryption_key` elements
- `validityRestrictions` shall contain the serialization of the `validity_restrictions` data type
- the signature is applied to the `itsCertReq` field using the private key corresponding to the public key declared as `verification_key` (i.e. the request is self-signed)
- `subject_attributes` and `validity_restrictions` are defined in [1].

### 3.3.3 Request of a Long-Term Certificate (LTC)

**POST** [http://<ea\\_access\\_point>](http://<ea_access_point>)

Inputs:

- Content-type: application/x-its-request
- Content: binary encoded `EnrolmentRequest` object

Outputs:

- Content-type: application/x-its-response
- Content: binary encoded `EnrolmentResponse` object

### 3.3.3.1 Request format

The ITS-S must build its LTC request by following this process:

- an ECC private key is randomly generated (the response-decryption-key), the corresponding public key is computed (response-encryption-key)
- an `InnerECRequest` structure is built, containing:
  - a randomly generated `requestIdentifier`
  - the canonical identifier of the ITS-S
  - the desired attributes
  - some optional restrictions
  - the response-encryption-key
- a `SignedData` structure is built, with:
  - the `signedContentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-EnrolmentRequest`
  - the `signedContent` containing the `InnerECRequest`
  - the `signedAttributes` collection containing an `attr-signingTime` attribute
  - the signer declared as self
  - the signature computed using the canonical private key
- an `EncryptedData` structure is built, with:
  - the recipients are the LTCA, the recipient public key to use is the `encryption_key` of the LTCA certificate
  - the `encryptedContentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData`
  - the `encryptedContent` containing the encrypted representation of the `SignedData` structure
- a `Data` structure is built, with:
  - the `contentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData`
  - the content containing the `EncryptedData` structure

```
InnerECRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
  requestIdentifier OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
  itsId IA5String,
  wantedSubjectAttributes SubjectAttributes,
  wantedValidityRestrictions ValidityRestrictions OPTIONAL,
  responseEncryptionKey PublicKey }
```

`wantedSubjectAttributes` is the serialization of the `subject_attributes` structure defined in ETSI Standard [1]; it must contain exactly one instance of the following elements:

- a `verification_key`,
- an `its_aid_ssp_list`

`wantedValidityRestrictions` is the serialization of the `subject_validity_restrictions` defined in ETSI Standard [1]; this field is optional because the LTCA already knows the ITS-S and can set duration and region restrictions on its own.

The `requestIdentifier` can be reused by the ITS-S if network connectivity has been lost during the transaction. In that case, it is expected to send the exact same request.

### Security characteristics

- Identity is ensured by the `itsId` present in the request.
- Integrity is ensured by the signature and verified by checking the signature against the canonical public key associated to this `itsId`.
- Confidentiality is ensured by encrypting the request with the encryption public key of the LTCA certificate.
- Anonymity of the requestor toward an external attacker is ensured by the confidentiality of the request and its signature. Anonymity of the requestor toward the LTCA is not a concern (LTCA must know and recognize the requestor).

### 3.3.3.2 Response format

The ITS-S shall receive a Data structure, containing an `EncryptedData` structure, containing a `SignedData` structure, containing an `InnerECResponse` structure. In some specific error cases, the `EncryptedData` structure can be missing, for example if the LTCA hasn't been able to read or validate the `responseEncryptionKey` in the request.

- if the LTCA has been able to read and to validate the `responseEncryptionKey` in the request:
  - the outermost structure is a Data structure with its `contentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData`
  - the content octet string contains an `EncryptedData` structure, with:
    - `recipients` references the `responseEncryptionKey` set in the request, the recipient identifier is computed as described in section `EncryptedData`
    - the `encryptedContentType` is set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData`
    - the `encryptedContent`, once decrypted, contains a `SignedData` structure
- if the LTCA hasn't been able to read and validate the `responseEncryptionKey` in the request:
  - the outermost structure is a Data structure with its `contentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData`
  - the content contains a `SignedData` structure

In both cases, this expected `SignedData` structure is:

- the `signedContentType` is set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-EnrolmentResponse`
- the `signedContent` contains the `InnerECResponse`
- the `signer` is populated with the `certificateDigest` field, containing the HashedId8 of the LTCA
- the signature is computed using the LTCA certificate private verification key corresponding to its public `verification_key` found in the LTCA certificate

The `InnerECResponse` shall contain:

- the `requestHash` is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the Data structure received in the request
- a `responseCode` indicating the result of the request
- if `responseCode` is 0, indicating a positive response, then a certificate is returned, and optionally a CA contribution value for the ITS to compute its private key of his LTC certificate (implicit certificates using ECQV).
- if `responseCode` is different than 0, indicating a negative response, then no certificate and no CA contribution value will be returned.

```
InnerECResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    responseCode EnrolmentResponseCode,
    certificate OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
    cAContributionValue INTEGER OPTIONAL }
-- requestHash is a truncated SHA256 of the whole Data structure received
```

```
EnrolmentResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
    ok(0),
    cantparse, -- valid for any structure
    badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not enrolmentrequest
    imnotintherecipient, -- the "recipients" doesn't include me
    unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
    decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
    unknownnits, -- can't retrieve the ITS from the itsId
    invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request fails
    invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the responseEncryptionKey is bad
    baditsstatus, -- revoked, not yet active
    incompletrequest, -- some elements are missing
    deniedpermissions, -- requested permissions are not granted
    invalidkeys, -- either the verification_key of the encryption_key is bad
    deniedrequest, -- any other reason?
    ... }
```

### Security characteristics

- Identity is ensured by the signer identifier of the `SignedData` structure (contains the HashedId8 of the LTCA certificate).
- Integrity is ensured by the signature and verified by checking the signature against the `verification_key` of the LTCA certificate.
- Confidentiality is ensured by encrypting the response with the `responseEncryptionKey` provided in the request. If this key was not valid, confidentiality is not ensured, but no personal information is returned.
- Anonymity of the requestor toward an external attacker is ensured by the absence of identifiable information returned when no encryption is possible, and by encryption of the response where possible.

## 3.3.4 Request of a Pseudonym Certificate (PC)

### **POST http://aa\_access\_point**

#### Inputs:

- Content-type: application/x-its-request
- Content: binary encoded `AuthorizationRequest` object

#### Outputs:

- Content-type: application/x-its-response
- Content: binary encoded `AuthorizationResponse` object

### 3.3.4.1 Request format

The ITS-S must build its PC request by following this process:

- an ECC private key is randomly generated (the response-decryption-key), the corresponding public key is computed (response-encryption-key)
  - a random 32 octets long secret key (hmac-key) is generated
  - a tag using the HMAC-SHA256 function is computed using the previously generated hmac-key, on the concatenation of the serialization of verificationKey and encryptionKey elements (encryptionKey is optional); this tag is truncated to 128 bits and named keyTag
  - a SharedATRequest structure is built, with:
    - a randomly generated requestIdentifier
    - the eaId identifying the LTCA to contact for verification
    - the calculated keyTag
    - the desired attributes
    - some optional restrictions
    - a desired start date and time
    - the response-encryption-key
  - a SignedData structure is built, with:
    - the signedContentType set to id-ITS-ISE-ct-SharedATRequest
    - the signedAttributes collection containing an attr-signingTime attribute
    - the signedContent is absent (external signature)
    - the signer declared as a certificateDigest referencing the LTC
    - the signature computed using the LTC certificate verification private key
  - an EncryptedData structure is built, with:
    - the recipient is the LTCA, the recipient public key to use is the encryption\_key of the LTCA
    - the encryptedContentType set to id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData
    - the encryptedContent containing the encrypted representation of the previous SignedData structure
  - an InnerATRequest structure is built, containing:
    - the verificationKey requested for certification
    - an optional encryptionKey to be placed in the same certificate
    - the generated hmac-key
    - the signedByEC containing the SharedATRequest structure
    - the detachedEncryptedSignature containing the previous EncryptedData structure
  - an EncryptedData structure is built, with:
    - the recipients are the PCA, the recipient public key to use is the encryption\_key of the PCA
    - the encryptedContentType set to id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationRequest
    - the encryptedContent containing the encrypted representation of the InnerATRequest structure
  - a Data structure is built, with:
    - the contentType set to id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData
    - the content containing the previous EncryptedData structure
- wantedSubjectAttributes shall not contain a verification\_key or

an encryption\_key attribute, but shall contain an its\_aid\_ssp\_list attribute.

```
SharedATRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestIdentifier OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    eaId HashedId8,
    keyTag OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    wantedSubjectAttributes SubjectAttributes,
    wantedValidityRestrictions ValidityRestrictions OPTIONAL,
    wantedStart Time32,
    responseEncryptionKey PublicKey }
```

```
InnerATRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    verificationKey PublicKey,
    encryptionKey PublicKey OPTIONAL,
    hmacKey OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)),
    signedByEC SharedATRequest,
    detachedEncryptedSignature EncryptedData }
```

The figure 3 illustrates the structure of a PC request.




Figure 3: Structure of a PC request

### Security characteristics

- Identity is ensured by the signer identifier present in the encrypted signature.
- Integrity is ensured by the signature and verified by checking the signature against the public key associated to this signer (found in the corresponding LTC). The signature indirectly covers the `verificationKey` and `encryptionKey` elements, by their digests (second pre-image resistance of the hash function, which is greater than the collision resistance used in signatures). The PCA cannot verify the signature, only the LTCA can do it, but the PCA can verify the requested permissions, and can verify that the HMAC signature of the public keys match the given `keyTag`.
- Confidentiality toward an external attacker is ensured by encrypting the request to the encryption key of the PCA.
- Anonymity of the requestor toward an external attacker is ensured by the confidentiality of the request and its signature. Anonymity of the requestor toward the PCA is ensured by the additional encryption of the signature and the signer. Anonymity of the requestor toward the LTCA isn't a concern (the LTCA must know and recognize the requestor).
- Unlinkability of the pseudonym certificates toward an external attacker is ensured by the confidentiality characteristics. Unlinkability of the pseudonym certificates toward the PCA is ensured by the additional encryption of the signature and the signer. Unlinkability of the pseudonym certificates toward the LTCA is ensured by hiding the final public keys to certify from the LTCA.

### 3.3.4.2 Response format

The ITS-S shall receive a Data structure, containing an `EncryptedData` structure, containing a `SignedData` structure, containing an `InnerATResponse` structure. In some specific error cases, the `EncryptedData` structure can be missing, for example if the PCA hasn't been able to read or validate the `responseEncryptionKey` in the request.

- if the PCA has been able to read and validate the `responseEncryptionKey` in the request:
  - the outermost structure is a Data structure with its `contentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData`
  - the content octet string contains an `EncryptedData` structure, with:
    - recipients references the `responseEncryptionKey` set in the request, the recipient identifier is computed as described in section `EncryptedData`
    - the `encryptedContentType` is set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData`
    - the `encryptedContent`, once decrypted, contains a `SignedData` structure
- if the PCA hasn't been able to read and validate the `responseEncryptionKey` in the request:
  - the outermost structure is a Data structure with its `contentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData`
  - the content contains a `SignedData` structure

In both cases, this expected `SignedData` structure is:

- the `signedContentType` is set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationResponse`
- the `signedContent` contains the `InnerATResponse`
- the signer is populated with the `certificateDigest` field, containing the HashedId8 of the PCA
- the signature is computed using the PCA private key corresponding to its public `verification_key` found in the PCA certificate



The InnerATResponse shall contain:

- the requestHash is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the Data structure received in the request
- a responseCode indicating the result of the request
- if responseCode is 0, indicating a positive response, then subjectAssurance, startDate and endDate are returned to be set in corresponding PC
- if responseCode is different than 0, indicating a negative response, then no subjectAssurance, no startDate, and no endDate are returned

```
InnerATResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    responseCode AuthorizationResponseCode,
    certificate Certificate OPTIONAL,
    cAContributionValue INTEGER OPTIONAL }
-- requestHash is a truncated SHA256 of the whole Data structure received
```

```
AuthorizationResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
    ok(0), -- ITS->AA
    its-aa-cantparse, -- valid for any structure
    its-aa-badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not authorizationrequest
    its-aa-imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" doesn't include me
    its-aa-unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
    its-aa-decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
    its-aa-keysdontmatch, -- HMAC keyTag verification fails
    its-aa-incompletrequest, -- some elements are missing
    its-aa-invalidencryptionkey, -- the responseEncryptionKey is bad
    its-aa-outofsyncrequest, -- signingTime is outside acceptable limits
    its-aa-unknownea, -- the EA identified by eaId is unknown to me
    its-aa-invalididea, -- the EA certificate is revoked
    its-aa-deniedpermissions, -- I, the AA, deny the requested permissions -- AA->EA
    aa-ea-cantreachea, -- the EA is unreachable (network error?) -- EA->AA
    ea-aa-cantparse, -- valid for any structure
    ea-aa-badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not authorizationrequest
    ea-aa-imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't
include me
    ea-aa-unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
    ea-aa-decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM -- TODO: continuer
    invalidaa, -- the AA certificate presented is invalid/revoked/whatever
    invalidaasignature, -- the AA certificate presented can't validate the request
signature
    wrongea, -- the encrypted signature doesn't designate me as the EA
    unknownits, -- can't retrieve the EC/ITS in my DB
    invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request by the EC fails
    invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the key is bad
    deniedpermissions, -- permissions not granted
    deniedtoomanycerts, -- parallel limit
    ... }
```

### **Security characteristics**

- Identity is ensured by the signer identifier of the SignedData structure (contains the HashedId8 of the PCA's certificate).
- Integrity is ensured by the signature and verified by checking the signature against the verification\_key of the PCA.
- Confidentiality is ensured by encrypting the response to the responseEncryptionKey provided in the request. If this key wasn't valid, confidentiality isn't ensured, but no personal information is returned.
- Anonymity of the requestor toward an external attacker is ensured by the absence of identifiable information returned when no encryption is possible, and by encryption of the response when possible.



## 3.3.5 Validate Pseudonym Certificate (PC) request

### POST http://ea\_access\_point

#### Inputs:

- Content-type: application/x-its-request
- Content: binary encoded `AuthorizationValidationRequest` object

#### Outputs:

- Content-type: application/x-its-response
- Content: binary encoded `AuthorizationValidationResponse` object

### 3.3.5.1 Request format

The PCA must build its permissions verification request by following this process:

- an ECC private key is randomly generated (the response-decryption-key), the corresponding public key is computed (response-encryption-key)
- an `AuthorizationValidationRequest` structure is built, with:
  - a randomly generated `requestIdentifier`
  - the `sharedATRequest` containing the `signedByEC` submitted in the pseudonym certificate request
  - the `detachedEncryptedSignature` submitted in the same pseudonym certificate request
  - the `responseEncryptionKey`
- a `SignedData` structure is built, with:
  - the `signedContentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationValidationRequest`
  - the `signedContent` containing the `AuthorizationValidationRequest`
  - the `signedAttributes` collection containing an `attr-signingTime` attribute
  - the signer declared as certificate and contains the PCA certificate
  - the signature is computed using the PCA signature private key
- an `EncryptedData` structure is built, with:
  - the recipient is the LTCA, the recipient's public key to use is the `encryption_key` of the LTCA
  - the `encryptedContentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData`
  - the `encryptedContent` containing the encrypted representation of the `SignedData` structure
- a `Data` structure is built, with:
  - the `contentType` set to `id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData`
  - the content containing the `EncryptedData` structure

```
AuthorizationValidationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestIdentifier OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    sharedATRequest SharedATRequest,
    detachedEncryptedSignature EncryptedData,
    responseEncryptionKey PublicKey }
```

The figure 4 illustrates the structure of PC validation request.




Figure 4: The structure of PC validation request

### Security characteristics

- Identity is ensured by the PCA certificate used as the signer identifier in the `SignerInfo` structure.
- Integrity is ensured by the signature and verified by checking the signature against the verification public key assessed in this certificate. The validity of the requestor PCA is verified by chaining the certificate to a trusted root.
- Confidentiality is ensured by encrypting the request with the encryption public key of the LTCA certificate.
- Anonymity of the ITS-S toward an external attacker is ensured by the confidentiality of the request.

### 3.3.5.2 Response format

The PCA shall receive a Data structure, containing an EncryptedData structure, containing a SignedData structure, containing an AuthorizationValidationResponse structure. In some specific error cases, the EncryptedData structure can be missing, for example if the LTCA hasn't been able to read or validate the responseEncryptionKey in the request.

- if the LTCA has been able to read and validate the responseEncryptionKey in the request:
  - the outermost structure is a Data structure with its contentType set to id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData
  - the content octet string contains an EncryptedData structure, with:
    - recipients references the responseEncryptionKey set in the request, the recipient identifier is computed as described in section EncryptedData
    - the encryptedContentType is set to id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData
    - the encryptedContent, once decrypted, contains a SignedData structure
- if the LTCA is not able to read and to validate the responseEncryptionKey in the request:
  - the outermost structure is a Data structure with its contentType set to id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData
  - the content contains a SignedData structure

In both cases, the expected SignedData structure is:

- the signedContentType is set to id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationValidationResponse
- the signedContent contains the AuthorizationValidationResponse
- the signer is populated with the certificateDigest field, containing the HashedId8 of the LTCA certificate.
- the signature is computed using the LTCA private key corresponding to its public verification\_key found in the LTCA certificate

The InnerATResponse shall contain:

- the requestHash is the left-most 16 octets of the SHA256 digest of the Data structure received in the request
- a responseCode indicating the result of the request

```
AuthorizationValidationResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    responseCode AuthorizationValidationResponseCode,
    subjectAssurance SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL,
    startDate [0] Time32 OPTIONAL,
    endDate [1] Time32 OPTIONAL }

-- requestHash is a truncated SHA256 of the whole Data structure received
```

```
AuthorizationValidationResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
    ok(0),
    cantparse, -- valid for any structure
    badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not permissionsverificationrequest
    imnotintherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't
include me
    unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
    decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
    invalidaa, -- the AA certificate presented is invalid/revoked/whatever
    invalidaasignature, -- the AA certificate presented can't validate the request
signature
    wrongea, -- the encrypted signature doesn't designate me as the EA
    unknownits, -- can't retrieve the EC/ITS in my DB
    invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request by the EC fails
    invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the responseEncryptionKey is bad
    deniedpermissions, -- requested permissions not granted
    deniedtoomanycerts, -- parallel limit
    deniedrequest, -- any other reason?
    ... }
```

### Security characteristics

- Identity is ensured by the signer identifier of the `SignedData` structure (contains the HashedId8 of the LTCA).
- Integrity is ensured by the signature and verified by checking the signature against the `verification_key` of the LTCA certificate.
- Confidentiality is ensured by encrypting the response with the `responseEncryptionKey` provided in the request. If this key wasn't valid, confidentiality isn't ensured, but no personal information is returned.
- Anonymity of the ITS-S requesting a pseudonym certificate toward an external attacker is ensured by the absence of identifiable information returned when no encryption is possible, and by encryption of the response when possible.

### 3.3.6 Get CRL

**GET http://dc\_access\_point/getcrl/HashedId8**

The abs\_path part of the HTTP request is built by taking the DC access point (from the TSL or from an ad-hoc configuration), appending "/getcrl/", and the uppercase hexadecimal representation of HashedId8.

Inputs:

- No inputs

Outputs:

- Content-type: application/x-its-crl
- Content: binary encoded CRL object issued by the entity identified by HashedId8

The format of CRL is described in section 3.2.6.

### 3.3.7 Get TSL

**GET http://dc\_access\_point/gettsl/HashedId8**

The abs\_path part of the HTTP request is built by taking the DC access point (from the TSL or from an ad-hoc configuration), appending "/gettsl/", and the uppercase hexadecimal representation of HashedId8.

Inputs:

- No inputs

Outputs:

- Content-type: application/x-its-tsl
- Content: binary encoded TSL object issued by the entity identified by HashedId8

The format of TSL is described in section 3.2.7.

## 4. Appendix A: Examples of request

### 4.1 Long Term Certificate request example

The ITS-S whose canonical ID "Renault-123456" requests an LTC usable for CAM and DENM with some permissions, and no validity restriction. The `InnerECRequest` content is:

```
innerecreq InnerECRequest ::= {
  requestIdentifier 'E665759B9756D789FCCB1B2577E46A66'H,
  itsId "Renault-123456",
  wantedSubjectAttributes '30
000002D50E7A16DEF1F5E2FB22F85ED8FC4E9F8D22404061EE6F22290280807CC223F2
21092403010000250401000000'H, -- a verification_key and 2 ITSAIDSSP (CAM&DENM)
  responseEncryptionKey {
    type compressed-lsb-y-0,
    x '77BCBC87A68ECFE8CD7DD6CDC0320A9806996CF5A08D72C3226450E68BF33BD0'H
  }
}
```

The DER encoding of this `innerecreq` is the following octet stream, 126 octets long, here beautified for readability:

```
30 7C -- InnerECRequest
04 10 E665759B9756D789FCCB1B2577E46A66 -- requestIdentifier
16 0E 52656E61756C742D313233343536 -- itsId
04 31
30000002D50E7A16DEF1F5E2FB22F85ED8FC4E9F8D22404061EE6F22290280807CC223F221092403010000250401000
000 -- wantedSubjectAttributes
30 25 -- responseEncryptionKey
0A 01 02 -- type
02 20 77BCBC87A68ECFE8CD7DD6CDC0320A9806996CF5A08D72C3226450E68BF33BD0 -- x
```

This PDU is then encapsulated in a `SignedData` structure:

```
signedreq SignedData ::= {
  version v1,
  hashAlgorithms {
    { algorithm id-sha256 }
  },
  signedContentType id-ITS-ISE-ct-EnrolmentRequest,
  signedContent '... here goes the innerecreq ...'H,
  signerInfos {
    {
      version v1,
      signer self:NULL,
      digestAlgorithm { algorithm id-sha256 },
      signatureAlgorithm { algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256 },
      signedAttributes {
        {
          attrType id-messageDigest,
          attrValue OCTET STRING ::=
'AA349D9F1817AF5C662B04250427B3E2D07A027FD8AEA70114783661EA5DB11D'H -- SHA256 digest value of
innerecreq
        },
        {
          attrType id-contentType,
          attrValue OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ITS-ISE-ct-EnrolmentRequest
        },
        {
          attrType id-signingTime,
          attrValue INTEGER ::= 1426674524 -- 18 march 2015 10:28:44 UTC
        }
      },
    },
    -- no certificateChain
  },
}
```

```

signature
'304502206982D1E49CA00BCE5F9DB81FDFEC06FE3AAC4915394FA7F171AED076E443C655022100DF88B8C08F5FA3B5
7DEA4D66A5DBEDEF378CC7500D9F2DC13AC50BA0DAADCF10'H
}
}
}

```

The DER encoding of this `signedreq` is the following octet stream, 344 octets long:

```

30 82 0154 -- SignedData
30 0D -- hashAlgorithms
30 0B -- HashAlgorithmIdentifier
06 09 608648016503040201 -- id-sha256
06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010104 -- id-ITS-ISE-ct-EnrolmentRequest
04 7E <...insert here the innerecreq...>
30 81 B4 -- SignerInfos
30 81 B1 -- SignerInfo
30 66 -- signedAttributes
30 30
06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010301 -- id-messageDigest
04 20 AA349D9F1817AF5C662B04250427B3E2D07A027FD8AEA70114783661EA5DB11D
30 1C
06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010302 -- id-ContentType
06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010104
30 14
06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010303 -- id-signingTime
02 04 5509535C
04 47
304502206982D1E49CA00BCE5F9DB81FDFEC06FE3AAC4915394FA7F171AED076E443C655022100DF88B8C08F5FA3B57
DEA4D66A5DBEDEF378CC7500D9F2DC13AC50BA0DAADCF10 -- signature

```

This PDU is then encrypted using the AES-128-CCM mechanism with default ETSI TS103097 parameters (this produces a 360 octets long octet string), and the AES key is encrypted using ECIES mechanism with default ETSI TS103097 parameters to the LTCA identified by its HashedId8='0001020304050607'H. The resulting EncryptedData structure is built like this:

```

encryptedreq EncryptedData ::= {
  version v1,
  recipients {
    {
      recipient '0001020304050607'H,
      kexalgid { algorithm id-ecies-103097 },
      encryptedKeyMaterial
'304C30260A0103022100ABC4563E98E4395FC2D968E2ADA4A310D49D5D9E4C929EC1F5EDF13F6D8797CC04107F64B4
47AF6913833C1C5F5BF60131930410E93749FF54892F24533A1EE746EF23C2'H -- contains an
ECIESEncryptedKey103097
    }
  },
  encryptedContentType id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData,
  contentEncryptionAlgorithm {
    algorithm aes-128-ccm-103097,
    parameters { aes-nonce '000102030405060708090A0B0C'H }
  },
  encryptedContent '... here goes the encrypted signedreq ...'H
}

```

The DER encoding of this `encryptedreq` is the following octet stream, 507 octets long:

```

30 82 01F7 -- EncryptedData
30 5C -- recipients
30 5A -- RecipientInfo
04 08 0001020304050607 --recipient
04 4E
304C30260A0103022100ABC4563E98E4395FC2D968E2ADA4A310D49D5D9E4C929EC1F5EDF13F6D8797CC04107F64B44
7AF6913833C1C5F5BF60131930410E93749FF54892F24533A1EE746EF23C2 -- encryptedKeyMaterial
06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010102 -- id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData
30 1D -- encryptionAlgorithm
06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010201 -- ce-aes-128-ccm-103097

```

```
04 0D 000102030405060708090A0B0C -- aes-nonce
04 82 0168 <...insert here the encrypted signedreq...>
```

This PDU is then encapsulated in a Data structure, built like this:

```
enrolmentrequest Data ::= {
  version v1,
  contentType id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData,
  content '... here goes the encryptedrec ...'H
}
```

The DER encoding of this enrolmentrequest is the following octet stream, 529 octets long:

```
30 82 020B -- Data
06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010103 -- id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData
04 82 01FB <...insert here the encryptedreq...>
```

## 4.2 Pseudonym Certificate request example

An ITS-S requests an PC usable for CAM and DENM with some permission, no encryption key, and no validity restrictions. First, a SharedATRequest is built:

```
sharedatreq SharedATRequest ::= {
  requestIdentifier '41E33B6C090187D2BAE0A4E8C5A77DC4'H,
  eaId '0001020304050607'H, -- the EA
  keyTag 'FA5BECEAA0E6E5B6088DE52EDAD6F18F'H,
  wantedSubjectAttributes '0D21092403010000250401000000'H, -- 2 ITSAIDSSP (CAM&DENM)
  -- no wantedValidityRestrictions
  wantedStart 1426723200, -- 19 march 2015 00:00:00 UTC
  responseEncryptionKey {
    type compressed-lsb-y-1,
    x 'F302F81307B7CA056023EA959EAB932D043AA7C86ACA6B4ECE8E8F5FDC35AE4F'H
  }
}
```

The DER encoding of this sharedatreq is the following octet stream, 110 octets long:

```
30 6C -- SharedATRequest
04 10 41E33B6C090187D2BAE0A4E8C5A77DC4 -- requestIdentifier
04 08 0001020304050607 -- eaId
04 10 FA5BECEAA0E6E5B6088DE52EDAD6F18F -- keyTag
04 0E 0D21092403010000250401000000 -- wantedSubjectAttributes
02 04 550A1180 -- wantedStart
30 26 -- responseEncryptionKey
0A 01 03 -- type
02 21 00F302F81307B7CA056023EA959EAB932D043AA7C86ACA6B4ECE8E8F5FDC35AE4F -- x
```

This sharedatreq needs to be signed, so a SignedData structure is built:

```
signedextsharedatreq SignedData ::= {
  version v1,
  hashAlgorithms {
    { algorithm id-sha256 }
  },
  signedContentType id-ITS-ISE-ct-SharedATRequest,
  -- no signedContent, this is an external signature
  signerInfos {
    {
      version v1,
      signer certificateDigest {
        algorithm { algorithm id-sha256 },
        digest '97583D6CE5C46B5E'H -- this is the HashedId8 of the EC
      },
      digestAlgorithm { algorithm id-sha256 },
      signatureAlgorithm { algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256 },
      signedAttributes {
        {
          attrType id-messageDigest,
```



```

        attrValue OCTET STRING ::=
'01E10ED2BD3E0FFB451FD64036ED12A1B5942F78365CF39D5F22C9A3DF3F697A'H -- SHA256 digest value of
sharedatreq
    },
    {
        attrType id-contentType,
        attrValue OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= id-ITS-ISE-ct-SharedATRequest
    },
    {
        attrType id-signingTime,
        attrValue INTEGER ::= 1426674528 -- 18 march 2015 10:28:48 UTC
    }
},
-- no certificateChain
signature
'304402201C1B4CCA76525F1830A22E7E6B8F6ABEAABC72B0ECAC175CEF6601CA35726AFD02205931C93E92E0D58BC6
B43EBFE75F29B1BDD4289EBE8E3467F2D640F800CC6234'H
    }
}

```

The DER encoding of this signedextsharedatreq is the following octet stream, 226 octets long:

```

30 81 DF -- SignedData
  30 0D -- hashAlgorithms
    30 0B -- HashAlgorithmIdentifier
      06 09 608648016503040201 -- id-sha256
    06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A0401010A
  30 81 BF -- signerInfos
    30 81 BC -- SignerInfo
      30 0A -- signer
        04 08 97583D6CE5C46B5E -- digest of EC
      30 66 -- signedAttributes
        30 30
          06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010301 -- id-messageDigest
          04 20 01E10ED2BD3E0FFB451FD64036ED12A1B5942F78365CF39D5F22C9A3DF3F697A
        30 1C
          06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010302 -- id-ContentType
          06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A0401010A
        30 14
          06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010303 -- id-signingTime
          02 04 55095360
        04 46
304402201C1B4CCA76525F1830A22E7E6B8F6ABEAABC72B0ECAC175CEF6601CA35726AFD02205931C93E92E0D58BC6B
43EBFE75F29B1BDD4289EBE8E3467F2D640F800CC6234 -- signature

```

This PDU is then encrypted using the AES-128-CCM mechanism with default ETSI TS103097 parameters (this produces a 242 octets long octet string), and the AES key is encrypted using ECIES mechanism with default ETSI TS103097 parameters to the LTCA identified by its HashedId8='0001020304050607'H. The resulting EncryptedData structure is built like this:

```

encryptedsignedextsharedatreq EncryptedData ::= {
  version v1,
  recipients {
    {
      recipient '0001020304050607'H,
      kexalgid { algorithm id-ecies-103097 },
      encryptedKeyMaterial
'304C30260A01030221008FE956196A3F36BD514AD219CAC462DC13B1F99C98BEAF8CDE6C64269A55DA6C04108B5B8E
36EAB36577F0B76270C45D1D8204103E05A6E942F0BEE2A12779BEBA7577E1'H -- contains an
ECIESEncryptedKey103097
    }
  },
  encryptedContentType id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData,
  contentEncryptionAlgorithm {
    algorithm aes-128-ccm-103097,

```

```
parameters { aes-nonce '000102030405060708090A0B0D'H }
},
encryptedContent '... here goes the encrypted signedextsharedatreq ...'H
}
```

The DER encoding of this `encryptedsignedextsharedatreq` is the following octet stream, 372 octets long:

```
30 82 0170 -- EncryptedData
  30 5C -- recipients
    30 5A -- RecipientInfo
      04 08 0001020304050607 --recipient
      04 4E
304C30260A01030221008FE956196A3F36BD514AD219CAC462DC13B1F99C98BEAF8CDE6C64269A55DA6C04108B5B8E3
6EAB36577F0B76270C45D1D8204103E05A6E942F0BEE2A12779BEBA7577E1 -- encryptedKeyMaterial
  06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010102 -- id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData
  30 1D -- encryptionAlgorithm
    06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010201 -- ce-aes-128-ccm-103097
    04 0D 000102030405060708090A0B0D -- aes-nonce
  04 81 E2 <...insert here the encrypted signedextsharedatreq...>
```

The `sharedatreq`, the `encryptedsignedextsharedatreq`, public keys, and HMAC key are then encapsulated in an `InnerATRequest`:

```
inneratreq InnerATRequest ::= {
  verificationKey {
    type compressed-lsb-y-1,
    x 'A009A3032AF6E9DC00BF70A9E36C84275A1CA8087A12245A7EB5DE2B2C805166'H
  },
  -- no encryptionKey
  hmacKey '60B316FD92AB81B793D5207F11AE34CF5AF6BA425A0B8395E2371DEB5479D3A2'H,
  signedByEC '... here goes the sharedatreq ...',
  detachedEncryptedSignature '... here goes the encryptedsignedextsharedatreq ...'
}
```

The DER encoding of this `inneratreq` is the following octet stream, 560 octets long:

```
30 82 022C -- InnerATRequest
  30 26 -- verificationKey
    0A 01 03 -- type
    02 21 A009A3032AF6E9DC00BF70A9E36C84275A1CA8087A12245A7EB5DE2B2C805166 -- x
  -- no encryptionKey
  04 20 60B316FD92AB81B793D5207F11AE34CF5AF6BA425A0B8395E2371DEB5479D3A2 -- hmacKey
  30 6C <...insert here the rest of the sharedatreq...>
  30 82 0170 <...insert here the rest of the encryptedsignedextsharedatreq...>
```

This PDU is then encrypted using the AES-128-CCM mechanism with default ETSI TS103097 parameters (this produces a 576 octets long octet string), and the AES key is encrypted using ECIES mechanism with default ETSI TS103097 parameters to the PCA identified by its `HashedId8`='08090A0B0C0D0E0F'H. The resulting `EncryptedData` structure is built like this:

```
encryptedreq EncryptedData ::= {
  version v1,
  recipients {
    {
      recipient '08090A0B0C0D0E0F'H,
      kexalgid { algorithm id-ecies-103097 },
      encryptedKeyMaterial
'304B30250A01030220214A61E116D709ABB38E211253A55BC66110C713C1253799AA1981A015A158060410E5A48762
5B458D28C96782E5FDB378A90410A3956CD0BA50F814F8BB6B6B4BCC5E1F'H -- contains an
ECIESEncryptedKey103097
    }
  },
  encryptedContentType id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationRequest,
  contentEncryptionAlgorithm {
    algorithm aes-128-ccm-103097,
    parameters { aes-nonce '000102030405060708090A0B0E'H }
  },
  encryptedContent '... here goes the encrypted inneratreq ...'H
}
```

}

The DER encoding of this `encryptedreq` is the following octet stream, 722 octets long:

```
30 82 02CE -- EncryptedData
  30 5B -- recipients
    30 59 -- RecipientInfo
      04 08 08090A0B0C0D0E0F --recipient
      04 4D
304B30250A01030220214A61E116D709ABB38E211253A55BC66110C713C1253799AA1981A015A158060410E5A487625
B458D28C96782E5FDB378A90410A3956CD0BA50F814F8BB6B6B4BCC5E1F -- encryptedKeyMaterial
  06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010106 -- id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationRequest
  30 1D -- encryptionAlgorithm
    06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010201 -- ce-aes-128-ccm-103097
    04 0D 000102030405060708090A0B0E -- aes-nonce
  04 82 0240 <...insert here the encrypted inneratreq...>
```

This PDU is then encapsulated in a Data structure, built like this:

```
authorizationrequest Data ::= {
  version v1,
  contentType id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData,
  content '... here goes the encryptedrec ...'H
}
```

The DER encoding of this `authorizationrequest` is the following octet stream, 744 octets long:

```
30 82 02E4 -- Data
  06 0C 2B0601040181AD5A04010103 -- id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData
  04 82 02D2 <...insert here the encryptedreq...>
```

## 5. Appendix B: Encryption of a message

This appendix describes cryptographic operations to be implemented to encrypt a message (any) according to the mechanisms used in ETSI Standards [1]. Message encryption is used for example to communicate between ITS-S and the PKI (LTCA / PCA), and between the PCA and LTCA entities of the PKI.

Encrypt a message  $m$  (N octets) from a sender to a receiver.

Assuming an elliptic curve ( $p$ : curve prime,  $G$ : base point,  $q$ : base point order).

Sender only knows the (certified) encryption public key “ $K_b$ ” of the receiver.

KDF(): SHA256( $S || \text{counter}$ )...

$E(a, b)$ :  $a \text{ xor } b$

$E^{-1}(a, b)$ :  $a \text{ xor } b$

MAC( $km, m$ ): HMAC( $km, m$ )

$||$ : concatenation

- Sender generates a random AES key  $A$  (128 bits, 16 octets)
- Sender chooses a nonce  $n$ , 12 octets
- Sender encrypts the message  $m$  with AES-CCM mode, the key  $A$ , and the nonce  $n$ . The output is the encrypted message  $M$  with an authentication tag ( $N+16$  octets).
- Sender generates an ephemeral private key  $r$  in  $[1, q-1]$ , and the associated public key  $v=r.G$ , 33 octets if compressed
- Sender derives a shared secret  $S$  from receiver encryption public key ( $K_b$ ):  $S=P_x$ , with  $(P_x, P_y)=r.K_b$  (verify that  $P \neq 0$ , if not, back to previous step)
- Sender then derives a set of keys  $ke$  and  $km$  with derivation algorithm:  $(ke || km)=KDF(S)$ ,  $ke$  is 16 octets long,  $km$  is 32 octets long
- Sender encrypts the AES key:  $c=E(ke, A)$ ,  $c$  is 16 octets long
- Sender produces a tag on the encrypted message:  $t=MAC(km, c)$ ,  $t$  is 16 octets long
- Sender transmits to the receiver a message  $C$  containing:
  - The identifier for the recipient's certificate ( $cert\_id$ ), 8 octets
  - The encrypted message  $M$
  - The encryption parameters (algorithm identifier  $aes\_128\_ccm$ , nonce  $n$ ), 13 octets
  - The ephemeral public key ( $v$ )
  - The encrypted key ( $c$ ) with the associated tag ( $t$ )

-  $8+N+16+13+33+16+16$ :  $102+N$  octets, plus protocol overheads.

- Receiver has its private key  $kb$ , and receives the message  $C$ .
- Receiver derives a shared secret  $S=P_x$ , with  $(P_x, P_y)=kb.v$
- Receiver derives  $(ke || km)=KDF(S)$
- Receiver checks that the tag  $t$  verifies  $MAC(km, c)$ , if not, receiver returns an error message

## 6. Appendix C: ASN.1 module

```

ISEEnrolmentProtocolv1
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
  enterprise(1) opentrust(22234) innovation(4) ise(1) modules(0)
  iseenrolmentprotocolv1(0) }

-- version BIT STRING { v1990(0), v1994(1), v1997(2) } ::= v1997

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
BEGIN

-- EXPORTS All
-- The types and values defined in this module are exported for use
-- in the other ASN.1 modules. Other applications may use them for
-- their own purposes.

IMPORTS
-- RFC5084 Appendix
  aes, id-aes128-CCM, id-aes256-CCM, AES-CCM-ICVlen
  FROM CMS-AES-CCM-and-AES-GCM
  { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1)
    pkcs-9(9) smime(16) modules(0) cms-aes-ccm-and-gcm(32) }

-- RFC5480
  ecdsa-with-SHA256, ecdsa-with-SHA384
  FROM PKIX1Algorithms2008
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) 45 }

-- RFC 4055 [RSAOAEP]
  id-sha256, id-sha384
  FROM PKIX1-PSS-OAEP-Algorithms
  { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
    security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
    id-mod-pkix1-rsa-pkalgs(33) } ;

/*****
-- OIDs
*****/
-- For the ISE project, lets allocate OIDs under the OpenTrust arc
id-OpenTrust OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) private(4)
enterprise(1) opentrust(22234) }
id-OT-Innovation OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OpenTrust 4 }
id-OT-Innovation-ISE OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OT-Innovation 1 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OT-Innovation-ISE 1 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-Data OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 1 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-SignedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 2 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-EncryptedData OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 3 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-EnrolmentRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 4 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-EnrolmentResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 5 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 6 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 7 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationValidationRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 8 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-AuthorizationValidationResponse OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 9 }
id-ITS-ISE-ct-SharedATRequest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-ct 10 }

id-ITS-ISE-algos OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OT-Innovation-ISE 2 }
id-aes128-CCM-103097 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-algos 1 }
id-ecies-103097 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-algos 2 }

id-ITS-ISE-attrs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-OT-Innovation-ISE 3 }
id-messageDigest OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-attrs 1 }
id-contentType OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-attrs 2 }
id-signingTime OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ITS-ISE-attrs 3 }

-- From FIPS 202 draft

```

```
id-sha3-256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2)
    country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101)
    csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 8 }

/*****
-- Misc
*****/
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1) }
HashedId8 ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(8))
Time32 ::= INTEGER (0..4294967295)
SubjectAssurance ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(1))
Certificate ::= OCTET STRING
SubjectAttributes ::= OCTET STRING
ValidityRestrictions ::= OCTET STRING
ContentType ::= OBJECT IDENTIFIER

PublicKey ::= SEQUENCE {
    type ECCPublicKeyType,
    x INTEGER }

ECCPublicKeyType ::= ENUMERATED {
    compressed-lsb-y-0(2),
    compressed-lsb-y-1(3) }

SignatureValue ::= OCTET STRING

-- SignatureValue should be opaque to the user/caller of security functions.
-- Internally, an ECDSA signature contains the following structure:
Ecdsa-Sig-Value ::= SEQUENCE {
    r INTEGER,
    s INTEGER }

/*****
-- A generic class for an algorithm
*****/
ALGORITHM ::= CLASS {
    &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Type OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    ID &id
    [PARMS &Type]
}

/*****
-- Signature algorithms declarations
*****/
sign-ecdsa-with-sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID ecdsa-with-SHA256 }

sign-ecdsa-with-sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID ecdsa-with-SHA384 }

-- No OID defined yet
-- sign-ecdsa-with-sha3-256 ALGORITHM ::= {
--     ID ecdsa-with-SHA3-256 }

SignatureFunctions ALGORITHM ::=
{
    sign-ecdsa-with-sha256
    | sign-ecdsa-with-sha384
    -- | sign-ecdsa-with-sha3-256
    , ... }

/*****
-- Content encryption algorithm declarations
*****/
CCMDefaultParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
```

```

    aes-nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE(12)) }

ce-aes-128-ccm-103097 ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID id-aes128-CCM-103097
    PARMS CCMDefaultParameters }

CCMParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
    aes-nonce OCTET STRING (SIZE(7..13)),
    aes-ICVlen AES-CCM-ICVlen DEFAULT 12 }

ce-aes-128-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID id-aes128-CCM
    PARMS CCMParameters }

ce-aes-256-ccm ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID id-aes256-CCM
    PARMS CCMParameters }

DataEncryptionFunctions ALGORITHM ::=
{
    ce-aes-128-ccm-103097
    | ce-aes-128-ccm
    | ce-aes-256-ccm
    , ... }

/*****
-- Key exchange algorithms declarations
*****/
-- ECIESParameters ::= SEQUENCE {
--     kdf KeyDerivationFunction OPTIONAL,
--     sym SymmetricEncryption OPTIONAL,
--     mac MessageAuthenticationCode OPTIONAL }

-- ke-ecies ALGORITHM ::= {
--     ID ecies-specifiedParameters
--     PARMS ECIESParameters }

ECIESEncryptedKey103097 ::= SEQUENCE {
    v PublicKey,
    c OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    t OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)) }

ke-ecies-103097 ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID id-ecies-103097 }

KeyEncryptionFunctions ALGORITHM ::=
{
    ke-ecies-103097
    -- | ke-ecies,
    , ... }

/*****
-- Hash algorithms declarations
*****/
hash-sha256 ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID id-sha256 }

hash-sha384 ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID id-sha384 }

hash-sha3-256 ALGORITHM ::= {
    ID id-sha3-256 }

HashFunctions ALGORITHM ::=
{
    hash-sha256
    | hash-sha384
    | hash-sha3-256
    , ... }

```

```

/*****
-- AlgorithmIdentifiers using the preceding ObjectSets
*****/
SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({SignatureFunctions}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({SignatureFunctions}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }

ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({DataEncryptionFunctions}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({DataEncryptionFunctions}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }

HashAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({HashFunctions}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({HashFunctions}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }

KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm ALGORITHM.&id({KeyEncryptionFunctions}),
    parameters ALGORITHM.&Type({KeyEncryptionFunctions}{@algorithm}) OPTIONAL }

/*****
-- Attributes
*****/
ATTRIBUTE ::= CLASS {
    &id OBJECT IDENTIFIER UNIQUE,
    &Type OPTIONAL
} WITH SYNTAX {
    ID &id
    [VALUE &Type]
}

attr-messageDigest ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    ID id-messageDigest
    VALUE OCTET STRING }

attr-contentType ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    ID id-contentType
    VALUE ContentType }

attr-signingTime ATTRIBUTE ::= {
    ID id-signingTime
    VALUE Time32 }

SupportedAttributes ATTRIBUTE ::=
{
    attr-messageDigest
    | attr-contentType
    | attr-signingTime
    , ... }

Attribute ::= SEQUENCE {
    attrType ATTRIBUTE.&id({SupportedAttributes}),
    attrValue ATTRIBUTE.&Type({SupportedAttributes}{@attrType}) OPTIONAL }

/*****
-- Data
*****/
Data ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    contentType ContentType,
    content OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }

/*****
-- SignedData
*****/
SignedData ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    hashAlgorithms HashAlgorithmsIdentifiers,

```



```

signedContentType ContentType,
signedContent OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
signerInfos SignerInfos }

HashAlgorithmsIdentifiers ::= SEQUENCE OF HashAlgorithmIdentifier

SignerInfos ::= SEQUENCE OF SignerInfo

SignerInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    signer [0] SignerIdentifier DEFAULT self:NULL,
    digestAlgorithm [1] HashAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm id-sha256 },
    signatureAlgorithm [2] SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256 },
    signedAttributes SignedAttributes,
    certificateChain SEQUENCE OF Certificate OPTIONAL,
    signature SignatureValue }

SignerIdentifier ::= CHOICE {
    self NULL,
    certificateDigest CertificateDigest,
    certificate Certificate }

CertificateDigest ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm HashAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm id-sha256 },
    digest HashedId8 }

SignedAttributes ::= SEQUENCE OF Attribute

/*****
-- EncryptedData
*****/
EncryptedData ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    recipients RecipientInfos,
    encryptedContentType ContentType,
    encryptionAlgorithm ContentEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier,
    encryptedContent OCTET STRING OPTIONAL }

RecipientInfos ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF RecipientInfo

RecipientInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    recipient HashedId8,
    kexalgid KeyEncryptionAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm id-ecies-103097 },
    encryptedKeyMaterial OCTET STRING }

/*****
-- EnrolmentRequest/Response
*****/
InnerECRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestIdentifier OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    itsId IA5String,
    wantedSubjectAttributes SubjectAttributes,
    wantedValidityRestrictions ValidityRestrictions OPTIONAL,
    responseEncryptionKey PublicKey }

InnerECResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    responseCode EnrolmentResponseCode,
    certificate Certificate OPTIONAL,
    cAContributionValue INTEGER OPTIONAL }
( WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), certificate PRESENT }
| WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode ALL EXCEPT (ok), certificate ABSENT, cAContributionValue ABSENT }
)
-- requestHash is a truncated SHA256 of the whole Data structure received

EnrolmentResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
    ok(0),
    cantparse, -- valid for any structure

```

```

badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not enrolmentrequest
imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" doesn't include me
unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
unknownits, -- can't retrieve the ITS from the itsId
invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request fails
invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the responseEncryptionKey is bad
baditsstatus, -- revoked, not yet active
incompleteterequest, -- some elements are missing
deniedpermissions, -- requested permissions are not granted
invalidkeys, -- either the verification_key of the encryption_key is bad
deniedrequest, -- any other reason?
... }

/*****
-- AuthorizationRequest/Response
*****/
SharedATRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestIdentifier OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    eaId HashedId8,
    keyTag OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    wantedSubjectAttributes SubjectAttributes,
    wantedValidityRestrictions ValidityRestrictions OPTIONAL,
    wantedStart Time32,
    responseEncryptionKey PublicKey }

InnerATRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    verificationKey PublicKey,
    encryptionKey PublicKey OPTIONAL,
    hmacKey OCTET STRING (SIZE(32)),
    signedByEC SharedATRequest,
    detachedEncryptedSignature EncryptedData }

InnerATResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    responseCode AuthorizationResponseCode,
    certificate Certificate OPTIONAL,
    caContributionValue INTEGER OPTIONAL }
( WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), certificate PRESENT }
| WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode ALL EXCEPT (ok), certificate ABSENT, caContributionValue ABSENT }
)
-- requestHash is a truncated SHA256 of the whole Data structure received

AuthorizationResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
    ok(0),
    -- ITS->AA
    its-aa-cantparse, -- valid for any structure
    its-aa-badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not authorizationrequest
    its-aa-imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
    its-aa-unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
    its-aa-decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
    its-aa-keystontmatch, -- HMAC keyTag verification fails
    its-aa-incompleteterequest, -- some elements are missing
    its-aa-invalidencryptionkey, -- the responseEncryptionKey is bad
    its-aa-outofsyncrequest, -- signingTime is outside acceptable limits
    its-aa-unknownea, -- the EA identified by eaId is unknown to me
    its-aa-invalidea, -- the EA certificate is revoked
    its-aa-deniedpermissions, -- I, the AA, deny the requested permissions
    -- AA->EA
    aa-ea-cantreachea, -- the EA is unreachable (network error?)
    -- EA->AA
    ea-aa-cantparse, -- valid for any structure
    ea-aa-badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not authorizationrequest
    ea-aa-imnottherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
    ea-aa-unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
    ea-aa-decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
    -- TODO: continuer
    invalidaa, -- the AA certificate presented is invalid/revoked/whatever
    invalidaasignature, -- the AA certificate presented can't validate the request signature

```

```

wrongea, -- the encrypted signature doesn't designate me as the EA
unknownits, -- can't retrieve the EC/ITS in my DB
invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request by the EC fails
invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the key is bad
deniedpermissions, -- permissions not granted
deniedtoomanycerts, -- parallel limit
... }

/*****
-- AuthorizationValidationRequest/Response
*****/
AuthorizationValidationRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestIdentifier OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    sharedATRequest SharedATRequest,
    detachedEncryptedSignature EncryptedData,
    responseEncryptionKey PublicKey }

AuthorizationValidationResponse ::= SEQUENCE {
    requestHash OCTET STRING (SIZE(16)),
    responseCode AuthorizationValidationResponseCode,
    subjectAssurance SubjectAssurance OPTIONAL,
    startDate [0] Time32 OPTIONAL,
    endDate [1] Time32 OPTIONAL }
( WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode (ok), subjectAssurance PRESENT }
  | WITH COMPONENTS { responseCode ALL EXCEPT (ok), subjectAssurance ABSENT, startDate ABSENT,
endDate ABSENT }
)
-- requestHash is a truncated SHA256 of the whole Data structure received

AuthorizationValidationResponseCode ::= ENUMERATED {
    ok(0),
    cantparse, -- valid for any structure
    badcontenttype, -- not encrypted, not signed, not permissionsverificationrequest
    imnotintherecipient, -- the "recipients" of the outermost encrypted data doesn't include me
    unknownencryptionalgorithm, -- either kexalg or contentencryptionalgorithm
    decryptionfailed, -- works for ECIES-HMAC and AES-CCM
    invalidaaa, -- the AA certificate presented is invalid/revoked/whatever
    invalidaaasignature, -- the AA certificate presented can't validate the request signature
    wrongea, -- the encrypted signature doesn't designate me as the EA
    unknownits, -- can't retrieve the EC/ITS in my DB
    invalidsignature, -- signature verification of the request by the EC fails
    invalidencryptionkey, -- signature is good, but the responseEncryptionKey is bad
    deniedpermissions, -- requested permissions not granted
    deniedtoomanycerts, -- parallel limit
    deniedrequest, -- any other reason?
    ... }

/*****
-- Standalone certificate request (similar to PKCS#10)
*****/
ITSCertificateRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
    itsCertReq ITSCertificateRequestContent,
    signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier DEFAULT { algorithm ecdsa-with-SHA256 },
    signature SignatureValue }

ITSCertificateRequestContent ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version DEFAULT v1,
    subjectName OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..32)),
    subjectAttributes SubjectAttributes,
    validityRestrictions ValidityRestrictions }

/*****
-- CRL
*****/
Crl ::= SEQUENCE {
    unsignedCrl ToBeSignedCrl,
    signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,

```

```

    signature SignatureValue }
-- signature is applied on unsignedCrl

ToBeSignedCrl ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version,
    signer SignerIdentifier,
    thisUpdate Time32,
    nextUpdate Time32,
    entries SEQUENCE OF HashedId8 }

/*****
-- TSL
*****/
Tsl ::= SEQUENCE {
    unsignedTsl ToBeSignedTsl,
    signatureAlgorithm SignatureAlgorithmIdentifier,
    signature SignatureValue }
-- signature is applied on unsignedTsl

ToBeSignedTsl ::= SEQUENCE {
    version Version,
    signerInfo SignerIdentifier,
    notBefore Time32,
    notAfter Time32,
    trustServices SEQUENCE OF TrustService }

TrustService ::= SEQUENCE {
    serviceId TRUSTSERVICE.&id ({TrustServiceSet}),
    serviceValue TRUSTSERVICE.&Value ({TrustServiceSet}{@serviceId}) }

TrustServiceSet TRUSTSERVICE ::=
{
    ts-foreignRoot
    | ts-renewedRoot
    | ts-ea
    | ts-aa
    | ts-distributionCenter
    | ts-otherTslPointer
    , ... }

TRUSTSERVICE ::= CLASS {
    &id ServiceType UNIQUE,
    &Value }
WITH SYNTAX {
    SYNTAX &Value
    ID &id }

ts-foreignRoot TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
    SYNTAX Certificate
    ID foreignRoot }

ts-renewedRoot TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
    SYNTAX SEQUENCE {
        rootCertificate Certificate,
        linkRootCertificate Certificate }
    ID renewedRoot }

ts-ea TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
    SYNTAX SEQUENCE {
        certificate Certificate,
        linkedCertificate Certificate OPTIONAL,
        accessPoint IA5String }
    ID ea }

ts-aa TRUSTSERVICE ::= {
    SYNTAX SEQUENCE {
        certificate Certificate,
        accessPoint IA5String }
    ID aa }

```

```
ts-distributionCenter TRUSTSERVICE ::= {  
    SYNTAX IA5String  
    ID distributionCenter }  
  
ts-otherTslPointer TRUSTSERVICE ::= {  
    SYNTAX IA5String  
    ID otherTslPointer }  
  
ServiceType ::= ENUMERATED {  
    foreignRoot,  
    renewedRoot,  
    ea,  
    aa,  
    distributionCenter,  
    otherTslPointer,  
    ... }  
  
END -- of ISEEnrolmentProtocolv1
```